After the conclusion of the Pingjin Campaign, the 40th and 43rd Divisions of the Fourth Field Army were unable to rest after their major battle. Instead, they quickly formed an advance detachment and marched south, traveling day and night to support the upcoming Battle of Crossing the Yangtze, which would be led by the Second and Third Field Armies. The main forces of the Fourth Field Army did not head south until April 11, their momentum aimed directly at Jiangnan. On April 28, the command center of the Fourth Field Army moved to Kaifeng. By this time开云体育(中国)官方网站, the cities of Anyang and Xinxiang were still under the control of the Nationalist forces, posing a significant threat to the flank of the advancing Fourth Field Army.

In fact, the 42nd Division of the Fourth Field Army had begun its attack on Anyang over two weeks earlier. The defending forces in Anyang were mostly notorious bandits, which made the battle exceptionally difficult. Initially, the 42nd Division had expected to capture Anyang in three days, but after nearly two weeks of fighting, they still hadn’t cleared all the outer defensive positions. When the 101st Division leader arrived in Kaifeng, he instructed the troops at the front lines to use explosives to destroy the enemy fortifications and prepare for street fighting. After a brief two-day rest, the 42nd Division changed its tactics, and within five days, on May 5, they successfully took Anyang. However, contrary to expectations, no significant street fighting occurred. The bandits, who had fought fiercely to defend the city, collapsed almost immediately once it was breached. The stark contrast in their behavior left the 101st Division leader with a new understanding of the bandits in Henan.

On the same day that Anyang was captured, the Nationalist forces defending Xinxiang declared their surrender, leading to the peaceful liberation of the city. Thus, the 42nd Division became the only unit in the Fourth Field Army with direct combat experience in Henan.

On May 22, Chen Zaidao, the commander of the Henan Military Region, visited the Fourth Field Army command to brief the 101st Division leader about the dire situation in the region. The Henan Military Region had been established on February 11, with 90,000 troops, most of whom were local forces with poor equipment and limited combat capability. Their primary tasks were maintaining law and order, protecting transport lines, and securing key sites, leaving only about 10,000 troops for mobile operations.

The bandits in Henan were particularly active at this time, with an estimated 200,000 bandits roaming the region, many of them former soldiers, criminals, and local thugs. In places like Que County, the bandits had killed entire families, consumed a third of the livestock, and left tens of thousands of acres of farmland abandoned. The situation in the Funiu Mountains was even worse, as the bandits had gained a foothold in nearly every village, making it impossible for local farmers to survive.

Given these circumstances, Chen Zaidao requested that the Fourth Field Army assist the Henan Military Region in suppressing the bandits. After careful consideration, the 101st Division leader concluded that the combat ability of the Henan bandits was substantial, and unless action was taken to eliminate the bandit threat, it could resurge at any time. Furthermore, both Bai Chongxi in Jiangnan and Hu Zongnan in Shaanxi were eyeing Henan and could use the chaos to their advantage.

Later that evening, the 101st Division leader sent a message to the Central Military Commission, suggesting that the 42nd Division, which had performed admirably in the Anyang campaign, be left behind to carry out the bandit suppression mission. Given the relatively short history of the 42nd Division and its weaker combat strength compared to other divisions, the leader also recommended that the Fifth Cavalry Division from the Fourth Field Army, stationed in Chengde, be reassigned to Henan.

On June 3, the Central Military Commission replied, authorizing the 42nd Division and the Fifth Cavalry Division to stay in Henan under the command of the Henan Military Region, assisting in bandit suppression and organizing the local population for support. This order caused discontent within the 42nd Division, as bandit warfare was far less rewarding than fighting Nationalist troops. The 101st Division leader issued an order to the division commanders to ensure that the troops remained focused and that morale was kept high, as they had to understand the importance of the mission.

Six days after the order was received, the Nationalist forces’ planned uprising in the Third Corps was foiled. The majority of the more than 20,000 troops who had been preparing to defect now betrayed their leaders. Liu Xicheng, the leader of the uprising, saw nearly 4,000 of his supporters killed in Lingbao County. However, thanks to a timely intervention by the independent regiment of the Shaanxi Military Division, Liu Xicheng’s remaining forces were saved from total annihilation.

As the uprising in the Third Corps collapsed, the number of bandits in Henan surged by another 20,000, further complicating the already fragile situation. Meanwhile, on June 12, in Guangzhou, Bai Chongxi decisively rejected peace negotiations proposed by Zhang Shizhao and Shao Lizi, thereby abandoning any plans for peaceful liberation of the Southwest. Two days later, the Fourth Field Army command left Kaifeng and headed toward Wuhan.

On June 16, the Henan Military Region convened a meeting to plan the next steps in suppressing the bandits, agreeing that the Third Corps of defectors would be their primary target. At the time, the commander of the Third Corps was Li Zikui, a notorious bandit leader from western Henan. Born in 1907 in Ma Jia Zhai village of Lingbao County, Li Zikui’s early life was marked by hardship and a difficult upbringing, which fueled his descent into a life of crime. By the time he led his bandit group, he had become a feared figure in the region. His story, one of survival and revenge, reflected the chaotic state of Henan, where banditry was a part of life for many.

Li Zikui's rise to power as a bandit leader was inextricably tied to the social and political instability of the region. His ruthless tactics and the way he exploited the lawlessness of the era gave him an edge over the many other bandits in the region. Despite his violent ways, he found support among the impoverished people of Henan, making him a formidable foe to those attempting to bring order to the area.